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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
In his paper, Cathal Woods deals both with the linguistic devices that critics may use 
to express their rejection of and objections to what an arguer has put forward, and 
with the way in which we can visualize such rejections and objections in a diagram. I 
am very much sympathetic to both of Woods’ projects, because, in my view, 
argumentation is a co-production of a proponent (arguer, protagonist) and an 
opponent (critic, antagonist), in the sense that the proponent’s argumentation can 
best be understood as the result of a dialogue in which the proponent responds to 
the critical reactions of the opponent who examines the proponent’s position. 
Consequently, to make progress in the study of argumentation, we need to have a 
clear grasp of the various ways of criticism, as well as of the ways to analyze and 
evaluate them. In addition to a number of critical remarks regarding some of Woods’ 
specific proposals, I shall attempt to contribute to the debate by adding some 
related ideas. 
 
2.  COMMENTS ON THE LANGUAGE OF REJECTION AND OBJECTION 
 
What Woods labels “rejection” and “disagreement,” I would label a “critical 
reaction.” As I understand Woods, he distinguishes between the various types of 
critical reaction by taking three parameters into account: first, the illocutionary 
force of a critical reaction; second, the propositional focus of a critical reaction; third, 
the norm that a critical reaction appeals to.  
First, he distinguishes between on the one hand doubt, examples of which 
would be “Really?” or “Why do you think that?”, and on the other hand dismissals, 
and denials, where the critic adopts a counter-standpoint of her own, such as “No!” 
The difference, I suppose, has to do with the differences in illocutionary force, for  
the reason that doubts seems to be associated with – what Searle labeled – 
directives, such as posing a question or making a request for an argument, whereas 
dismissals and denials seem to be associated with – what Searle called – assertives, 
such as denying something the proponent said, and thereby advancing a counter-
standpoint of her own.  
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Second, Woods distinguishes between various critical reactions by taking 
their propositional focus into account. Some question or deny a premise, whereas 
others focus on the argumentative connection.  
Third, Woods characterizes an objection as a critical reaction “which 
indicates the nature of B’s criticism of what A has said.” In this way the opponent, in 
my terminology, specifies and makes explicit the norm that she appeals to. In 
Woods’ examples, the objection either appeals to a norm to the effect that an 
argument is valid or at least sufficient strong, or to a norm to the effect that the 
premises used are true or acceptable. In my view, each critical reaction appeals to 
one norm or other, so even a simple challenge can be seen as appealing to the 
burden of proof rule, in that the message is that if the proponent will not answer 
adequately, his burden of proof will not be seen as having been discharged. Further, 
there is a wide range of dialogical norms that can be appealed to in criticism. The 
opponent might appeal to any rule for critical discussion, such as the language use 
rule, by pointing out that some phrase used by the proponent is insufficiently clear. 
Or she might appeal to an institutional rule, such as when a lawyer points out that 
the evidence, though extremely convincing in its own right, has not been obtained in 
an admissible way. Or she might appeal to an optimality rule, to the effect that –
though complying with all the rules for critical discussion- the argumentation is not 
up to standard, for example by not being very persuasive, or by not being efficiently 
phrased, and so forth. 
In addition to these three parameters for characterizing a particular type of 
critical reaction, a fourth could be added. Fourthly, one could indicate whether a 
critical reaction contributes to, on the one hand the ground level of dialogue, where 
the proponent and the opponent exchange arguments and requests for arguments, 
thereby co-producing the proponent’s argumentation, or to a meta-level of dialogue, 
a dialogue about a dialogue, in which the participants deal with the strategic quality 
of a previous move, or with the dialectical or institutional legitimacy of a previous 
move. A fallacy charge, for example, initiates such a meta-dialogue, just like a 
strategic remark such as “Wouldn’t it be better to support your position by way of a 
utilitarian argument, rather than that deontic one you just gave me?” In my view 
these four parameters –norm, level, force and focus- need, in the end, to be fully 
exploited in any systematic classification of types of criticism (see, Krabbe & Van 
Laar, 2011). 
What makes Woods’ project especially worthwhile is his interest in the 
ambiguity of criticism. His examples make it clear that some phrases for expressing 
a critical reaction allow, within their context of utterance, of more than one reading, 
because it has not been made sufficiently precise what the intended propositional 
focus of the criticism is. But then, each of the parameters may give rise to ambiguity. 
As to force, the critical reaction may be ambiguous for leaving it unclear whether the 
opponent is making a counter-assertion, or whether she is just firmly requesting for 
argument: “S? No!” As to norm, the critical reaction may be unclear for leaving it 
unclear whether the opponent appeals to the burden of proof rule, on the ground 
that this, apparently, cannot be proven, or some optimality rule, on the ground that 
this is unconvincing: “You can’t say this.” As to level, the criticism may be unclear for 
leaving it unclear whether it contributes to the ground level dialogue, by inviting the 
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proponent to offer a further argument, or to a meta-level dialogue, for example by 
inviting the proponent to revise his strategy or to withdraw an illegitimate move: 
“That’s utter nonsense!” The normative question that these ambiguous criticisms 
raise is: What if the proponent interprets the critical reaction different from was 
intended by the opponent, or in a way that happens to be unwelcome to her, and he 
develops an argument, on that basis, that happens  to be flawed, in the opponent’s or 
in the analyst’s eyes? Then, I surmise, the flaws in that argument are at least in part 
to be attributed to the opponent. 
In my final remark about the language of rejection and objection, I want to 
point out the importance of – what can be called – “counter-considerations” (Van 
Laar & Krabbe, 2012), which are those propositions with which the opponent 
motivates her critical stance, and thereby explains to the proponent why she is 
critical towards some assertion on his side, as well as informs him about what kind 
of strategy he should use in order to take away her critical doubts. These counter-
considerations can be seen as reasons, and thereby they are close to dismissals and 
objections. But different from expressing a counter-standpoint, that brings a burden 
of proof when challenged by the proponent, a counter-consideration does not 
constitute genuine argumentation. For, it is not an attempt to convince the 
proponent on the basis of what he is willing to concede. Rather, they are motivations 
that the proponent can take into account in order to device an argument that he can 
use in order to take away the specific doubts by the opponent regarding his position. 
In other words, the opponent does not have a burden of proof regarding counter-
consideration, but it remains up to the proponent to refute them. Thus, a critic might 
put forward highly informative criticism, without committing herself to the truth of 
the information, and yet steering the proponent’s argumentation in a particular 
direction: “Why should we take a dog? As far as you’ve shown, a dog would add 
expense” (cf. Rescher on cautious assertion, discussed in Van Laar & Krabbe, 2013). 
 
3. COMMENTS ON DIAGRAMMING REJECTION AND OBJECTION 
 
Woods’ second project about diagramming rejection and objection is important, for 
it concerns the relation between the dialogical process in which the participants, as 
it were, co-produce the proponent’s argumentation, and the final result or product 
of that process. Traditional diagrams are to be seen as the result of such 
argumentative exchange, and I agree with him that it would be very interesting to 
visualize the specific ways in which that result is partly generated by critical 
reactions of the interlocutor. 
A first comment on Woods’ specific proposal to diagram objections is to 
indicate the existence of a similar technique, not mentioned in his paper, that is used 
in computational dialectic, where defeat-relations between arguments and 
propositions are diagrammed (see for example, Pollock, 2010). 
 A second comment deals with the dialogical information already contained 
within the conventional diagramming techniques within argumentation theory, and 
within the pragma-dialectical method of reconstructing the argumentation structure 
in particular. As I read these argument diagrams, they do not merely diagram 
propositional relations in the abstract, but rather, propositional relations such that 
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if the opponent accepts the starting points she must withdraw her doubts regarding 
the conclusion. And therefore, these diagrams can be understood as already 
containing quite some information about the opponent’s critical reactions, albeit 
only as understood or as taken into account by the proponent. I shall deal with the 
various components of these diagrams, as used in the pragma-dialectical method, in 
turn: the arrow, the ampersand, the plus-sign, the circled plus-sign.  What do they 
express, given the dialogical understanding of argumentation as a series of 
responses to a series of critical reactions?  
An arrow pointing from premise A to (intermediate) conclusion B symbolizes 
a single attempt by the proponent to convince the opponent, and can thus be seen as 
expressing that the proponent either responds to a request for an argument, focused 
on proposition B, or that he anticipates such criticism. In other words, the arrow 
expresses that A is a response to a criticism of the form “Why B?”. We could include 
the criticism taken into account by adding a label to the arrow, containing the 
specific form that the criticism had. And if the opponent chose to accompany her 
challenge, “Why would I accept that John is Mary’s father?””, with a counter-
consideration, “As far as you’ve shown, nobody vouches for it!” (“Counter C”), this 
could be added to the label. As a result, the propositions that the opponent puts 
forward are not treated as reasons to convince the proponent, but their status as 
mere counter-considerations to be taken into account by the proponent is visualized 
by writing them on these labels.  
 
Figure 1 
 
Suppose opponent Olga would make a somewhat more radical choice, and chose to 
act herself as a second proponent, defending a counter-standpoint. Then, she must, 
of course, be seen as developing an argumentation of her own, responding to or 
anticipating criticism by her interlocutor Pierre – the former proponent now in the 
role of a second opponent. Therefore, a mixed discussion merits two separate 
diagrams. Of course, in so-far as the counter-argumentation by Olga expresses 
criticism towards Pierre’s argument, it must be taken into account in Pierre’s 
argument diagram by substantiating the labels with counter-considerations. Dual 
functions, such as discussed by Woods, then are only visualized by the fact that the 
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same proposition figures both in the argumentation diagram by Pierre (as a 
counter-consideration) as well as the one by Olga (as a premise in her 
argumentation), or vice versa. 
 The ampersand, &, symbolizes that two (or more) reasons, A and B, 
constitute the support of a single argumentation in favor of a conclusion C, and if the 
proponent’s expresses A first, and B second, then B can be seen as understood as a 
response to a critical reaction to the effect that it remains unclear how premise A 
can be used to convince the opponent of C. This kind of critical reaction could thus 
be attached to the ampersand with a label. If the critical reaction is accompanied 
with a counter-consideration, that could be included as well. Thus, if the 
proponent’s standpoint is that John is Mary’s father, and his first reason reads “Well, 
John is male,” then the opponent might challenge the connection between premise 
and conclusion saying “Why would I accept that John is Mary’s father on account of 
him being male?”, possibly accompanied by a counter-consideration “He might just 
be a friend!” One possible reaction for the proponent, them, is to add the link 
between premise and conclusion, saying “Well, John is one of Mary’s parents,” thus 
completing his single argumentation. (Of course, he could add novel evidence as 
well, in which case a different argumentation structure would arise.) 
 
Figure 2 
 
The plus-sign symbolizes that the premise to the right of it supplements the 
premise(s) to its left, so that the same attempt at persuasion becomes a stronger 
one. Thus, it anticipates, or responds to a critical reaction in which the opponent 
requests for a strengthening of the earlier argumentation: “What more do you have 
to go on?” or “These reasons do not suffice, so you might want to supplement them.” 
Again, this critical reaction can be fixed to the plus-sign.  
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Figure 3 
 
Finally, a similar story can be told about the circled plus-sign, which is made to 
represent situations where the proponent responds to, or anticipates specific 
counter-considerations (“objections,” as they are referred to in the pragma-
dialectical theory). So, according to this theory, this symbol always requires the 
mentioning of a counter-consideration. For example, if the proponent defends his 
standpoint that John is Mary’s father by saying that John said himself that he is her 
father, and the opponent counters that as far as she knows they do look alike, the 
proponent is, as it were, invited to refute this counter-consideration by saying, for 
example, that they do look alike (which of course, may need further support). 
 
 
Figure 4 
 
To conclude my second comment, a diagram of just the argumentation of the 
proponent already conveys much information about the criticism that drove the 
proponent to developing this very argumentation, and diagramming techniques 
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might take this into account, and visualize the driving force of the opponent’s critical 
moves. Note, that if argumentation is the result of reasoning with more than one 
opponent, the specific agents can be specified in the criticism-labels. 
 There is one shortcoming of my counter-proposal: It only visualizes the 
specific manner in which the proponent takes criticism into account. Some of 
Woods’ techniques are still needed in order to show criticisms that have not, or not 
yet, been taken into account, and they might be useful to represent critical reactions 
regardless of the specific way the proponent chooses them to deal with.  
Note, however, that I am not convinced that dashed arrows that do not start 
from a specific proposition (“formal objections”) have been visualized well by 
Woods’ system. For, as Woods says, a dashed arrow represents that “x is a reason 
for not accepting y,” and that does not lead to a result that is comprehensible if x is 
not replaced by a specific proposition. If he would mean something like “There 
exists some proposition x such that x is a reason against y,” then, I surmise, this 
amounts to a kind of meta-dialogical way of arguing that merits a separate 
treatment.  
 
4. CONCLUSION  
 
Woods’ article contributes in many interesting ways to the theory of criticism, and 
in my commentary I have only dealt with some of the basic points of his approach, 
trying especially to connect it with the kind of work in formal dialectic that I have 
been involved in myself. My main point for the further development of such a theory 
of criticism, is that it ought to do justice to the kind of dialogue in which an 
opponent puts forward highly informative criticism, yet without adopting herself 
any counter-standpoint. This would further clarify the basic notion of a critical 
discussion (or a persuasion dialogue, for that matter), by fully exploiting the 
dialectical asymmetry of a defending proponent and a critically examining 
opponent. 
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